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 Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?  
 
By Aviva Abramovsky1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This Essay suggests that a discussion on insurance regulation should 
include a consideration of the effect reinsurance may have on the behavior 
of insurers.  The Essay reviews the traditional types of reinsurance, and 
considers the ability of private reinsurance contracts to produce insurer 
action.  This essay suggests if reinsurance is not included in a holistic 
examination of the field, its realities have the capacity to misdirect 
insurance regulatory assumptions.  Moreover, reinsurance works as a 
source of independent and often unexamined contractual influence on 
insurer activity, and as a potential source of interference with regulatory 
proposals.   Even though reinsurance is initiated by private contract, those 
contracts have the potential for regulatory effect sufficient to provide a 
positive answer to this Essay’s main query: may reinsurance correctly be 
termed a “silent regulator”?   
 
 
 
“The first principle of regulation is: Lawyers and politicians write rules; and markets 
develop ways to circumvent these rules without violating them.”2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
When evaluating the efficacy of insurance regulation, the nature and availability 
of reinsurance does not count among the general issues commonly discussed.  Yet, as 
“the insurance of insurance companies”3, reinsurance should not be so quickly dismissed 
as irrelevant in the regulatory discussion.4  Just as insurance is often viewed as having a 
                                                 
1
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 Allan H. Meltzer, Regulatory Overkill, Wall Street Journal at A14, March 27, 2008. 
 
3
 See Continental Casualty Co. v. Stronghold Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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regulatory effect on insured industries, so too should reinsurance be considered as having 
a regulatory effect on its reinsureds.  
Much insurance regulatory policy focuses on capital reserves and issues of 
liquidity.  An examination of reinsurance is helpful because one of reinsurance’s primary 
uses is to expand an insurance company’s liquidity, an attractive quality for many 
primary insurers.5  Likewise, the reinsurance relationship concerns issues of insurance 
availability, organic standards for underwriting and claims handling, and premium 
calculations.6  Insurance companies that use reinsurance may contract to gain a certain 
amount of foreseeable stability in their losses and is frequently used as a “stop gap” in the 
event of catastrophic losses.7  More generally, reinsurance, as a contract of indemnity 
with conditions for performance, has all the potential of regular insurance to influence the 
activity of reinsureds.  
                                                                                                                                                 
4
 See Gary Marchitello, Ignore Reinsurance at Your Peril, Risk Management Magazine 46 (December 
2007) (“Discounting the importance of the vital role of reinsurance in risk spreading and how the pricing, 
stability and capacity of reinsurance can influence the viability of one’s own direct insurance purchases can 
be a critical and potentially costly mismanagement.”). 
 
5
 Among issues to be addressed is how the existence of reinsurance requires the inclusion of the reinsuring 
company’s stability in the calculus of insurer stability. To a great effect, reinsurance leverages insurance 
industry assets; for this reason alone its nature should be examined in the regulatory context.   
 
6
 See RAA webpage, Fundamentals of Property Casualty Reinsurance, 
http://www.reinsurance.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3310 (“Reinsurance provides protection against 
catastrophic loss in much the same way it helps stabilize an insurer’s loss experience.  Insurers use 
reinsurance to protect against catastrophes in two ways.  First, reinsurance protects against catastrophic 
financial loss resulting from a single event, such as the total fire loss of a large manufacturing plant.  
Second, reinsurance also protects against the aggregation of many smaller claims resulting from a single 
event, such as an earthquake or major hurricane, that affects many policyholders simultaneously.  While the 
insurer is able to cover losses individually, the aggregate may be more than the insurer wishes to retain.”).   
 
7
 See Graydon S. Staring, The Law of Reinsurance, sec. 1:3, 4-5 (“For the individual insurer the purchase 
of reinsurance has any or all of a number of objectives.  It will desire to limit the reserves it must maintain 
for losses on its ordinary business.  Beyond that, it may occasionally desire to write policies too large for its 
own resources, although otherwise routine, and earn premiums and good will for them.  It may desire to 
take a novel risk that its own experience does not permit it to rate, which can be assumed, however, with 
the support of a large amount of reinsurance.  Finally, it will certainly wish to avoid wide fluctuations in its 
financial condition from year to year and assure its own continued solvency, in the face of possible 
extraordinary losses due to natural and economic catastrophes touching its lines of business; it will do so by 
reinsuring itself against extraordinarily high losses on its entire business any year.”).   
 3 
Reinsurance is of grave consequence to insurance loss handling, yet there has 
been little discussion of the way reinsurance interacts with other de jure and de facto 
efforts of insurance regulation.  The utmost good faith obligation integral to reinsurance 
contract performance serves as the primary regulator of this relationship.8  These 
relationships concern reinsurance standards of performance and the potential effect on 
coverage availability; moreover, the relationships have a derivative effect on the cost and 
availability of various insurance lines.  Yet, reinsurance, beyond the risk of defaults or 
insolvencies, is not generally discussed beyond a few sentences in most regulatory 
discussions.  Nor is the regulatory capacity of reinsurance announced through statutory 
constructs.  Rather, reinsurance’s regulatory effect is accomplished through simple 
contractual relations, reliance on commercial standards in the performance of those 
contracts and, importantly, the courts’ use of the concept of utmost good faith in the 
apportionment of contractual duties.  In recognition of these effects, this Essay seeks to 
answer the question of whether reinsurance relationships can appropriately be considered 
a silent regulator of insurance industry.  
II. Reinsurance: What Is It and Why Have It? 
At its most reductive, reinsurance is a relatively straightforward financial transaction 
by which an insurance company is indemnified for all or a portion of some risk by 
                                                 
8
 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law, sec. 142[c], 3rd edition (2002), 1059 (“In many 
respects, the relationship between primary insurer and reinsurer tracks that of the original insured and the 
primary insurer.  The primary insurer and reinsurer have a duty to deal with each other in good faith, and 
the reinsurer will have available to it the defense of misrepresentation, breach of warranty, fraud, or 
concealment in circumstances where the primary insurer’s acts or neglect give rise to the defense.”).  See 
also Couch on Insurance, 3rd edition (2007), sec. 9:17, 56-57 (“Duties of good faith and fair dealing run 
between the reinsurer and the reinsured much as they do between the initial insured and his or her insurer.  
This duty originates from the reinsurer’s need to rely upon and not duplicate the reinsured’s efforts in 
properly evaluating risks and handling claims, reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract.  
Accordingly, this duty requires the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer all material facts which may affect 
the subject risk.  The extension of this duty of good faith is the related concept that reinsurers are generally 
bound by the reinsured’s good faith decision to pay a claim, commonly referred to as the ‘follow the 
settlements’ doctrine.”).   
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another insurer.9  This risk transfer, just as with common consumer or commercial 
insurance policies is effectuated by contract, with the reinsurance agreement subject to 
ordinary contract rules and doctrine.10  Some practices of reinsurance contract 
interpretation are distinct from the practices used in interpreting a more common 
insurance policy, but at this juncture, it is sufficient to recognize that reinsurance is a 
creature of contract.10  
1. What is Reinsurance? 
One of the hardships in understanding reinsurance is that the term is sometimes used 
over-broadly and applied to relationships which are best understood as something other 
than a commonly accepted definition of reinsurance.11  Reinsurance is best understood as 
distinct from co-insurance, the proper term for the relationship which forms when 
separate insurers, either severally or jointly, assume direct shares of a given risk; in such 
cases where all the insurers have a direct relationship with the insured, the relationship is 
not within the traditional understanding of reinsurance.12    Likewise, reinsurance should 
                                                 
 
9
 Id at sec. 140[a], 1053 (“Reinsurance is essentially a form of insurance for insurance companies; 
insurance business is transferred from one insurer to another.”).  Id.  
 
10
 See New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide, Vol. 3: Separate Lines of Insurance, sec. 40.01 
(2007), 6 (“The reinsurance relationship is evidenced by a written contract reflecting the negotiated terms.  
Although reinsurance contracts between different cedents and reinsurers can include clauses with similar 
purposes, the wording of particular provisions varies significantly, depending on the parties’ specific needs, 
customs and practices.”).   
 
10
 See Couch on Insurance, 3rd edition (2007), sec. 9:6, 21 (“Although some rules of construction do not 
apply to contracts in the reinsurance context, the general rules of contract do apply to reinsurance 
contracts.”). 
 
11
 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law, sec. 140[a], 3rd edition (2002), 1053 
(“Reinsurance should not be confused with the situation where one insured takes out two or more policies 
covering the same risk with two or more insurers.  Also, reinsurance should not be confused with the 
situation where the insured cancels one policy and substitutes another for it.  Reinsurance only exists where 
a primary insurer becomes a ‘reinsured’ by entering into a contract with another insurer, the ‘reinsured.’”).   
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be distinguished from banking even though it may assist in the reinsured’s financing and 
allow for insurance loss amortization.13 Nor is reinsurance a security, since the risks 
assumed are generally fortuities distinct from the ordinary risks of business and finance.14   
As a descriptive matter, reinsurance is inherently a contract of insurance, albeit a 
secondary one.15  Reinsurance is commonly defined as a contract “by which an insurer 
procures a third person to insure him against loss or liability by reason of such original 
insurance.”16  More generally, reinsurance includes all contractual arrangements where 
one insurance company transfers to another all or some portion of the risk it underwrites 
                                                                                                                                                 
12
 See Graydon S. Staring, The Law of Reinsurance, sec. 1:5, 9-10 (“Reinsurance is not coinsurance, which 
is the relationship that results when separate insurers, either severally or jointly, assume direct shares of a 
given risk; in that case, all the insurers have a direct contract with the insured.  It also is not a partnership, 
co-venture, or syndication, even though the contract may contain clauses creating or permitting joint 
responsibilities or control, as well as joint loss, since true reinsurance lacks essential characteristics of those 
relationships.”).   
 
13
 Id at 10 (“Neither is reinsurance banking, although it performs a function of banking by providing the 
amortization of insurance losses and may, in effect, finance the growth of the reinsured.”).  Id.  
 
14
 Id (noting reinsurance “is not a security as defined in the securities legislation, since the risk assumed are 
normally fortuities apart from the ordinary risks of business and finance.”).  Id.    
 
15
 See Couch on Insurance, 3rd edition (2007), sec. 9:1, 3-4 (“Reinsurance is a contract whereby one insurer 
transfers or ‘cedes’ to another insurer all or part of the risk it has assumed under a separate or distinct 
policy or group of policies in exchange for a portion of the premium.  While reinsurance technically 
qualifies as insurance, it is a contract for indemnity rather than liability.”).   
 
16
 Id. at 1:1 (to what cite?).  Reinsurance discussions, however, commonly and appropriately also extend to 
cover discussions of contracts which are entered to reinsure in the future.  In such circumstances, a contract 
to be reinsured is made between the parties to provide reinsurance on unidentified underlying policies yet 
to be written.  Though these agreements might not actually reinsure specific risks or liabilities, their 
ubiquity in the industry appropriately places them within any reinsurance discussion.  
 
This definition allows for the inclusion of both an existing policy or contract of reinsurance and 
assumes that the requirements of the contract are met.  Staring at 1:1, 2. A “reinsurance policy” can 
therefore simply be understood as a “contract for indemnity one insurer makes with another to protect the 
insurer from risks already assumed.”  Id. at 1:1.  Likewise a treaty looking forward to reinsure would 
constitute reinsurance, though such agreement may be better understood as a contract for reinsurance, 
rather than a contract of reinsurance. Id.  In either case, reinsurance policies, reinsurance treaties on specific 
classes of risk and reinsurance treaties entered into for future acquired risk would all come within the 
heading of reinsurance.  See Ostrager & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes, 12th edition 
at 15:01, 990. 
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to another insurer.17  Thus, the common refrain that reinsurance is insurance for insurance 
companies.18   
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the study of reinsurance stems from the 
particularly opaque and obscure language endemic to the industry.19  Some discussion of 
terms is necessary.  As reinsurance involves a minimum of two insurance companies, 
different terms have developed to identify the various parties.20  The original insurer who 
acquired the risk or liability is referred to by a variety of designations, including that of 
direct or initial insurer and sometimes, though less commonly, as the primitive insurer.21  
However designated, once it has entered into an agreement with a new insurer for the 
purpose of reinsurance, the original insurer is thereafter most commonly referred to as the 
                                                 
17
 See Colonial America Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 491 U.S. 244 (1989); Ostrager & Newman, 
Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes, 12th edition at 15:01, 990. 
 
18
 See Cont’l Cas v. Stronghold Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 16, 17, 20 (2d Cir 1995).  In that case, the Second Circuit 
offered an additional colorful and intuitive explanation of reinsurance adopted in a New York Court of 
Appeals decision of the late 1930’s. See Cont’l Cas v. Stronghold Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 16, 17 (2d Cir 1995) 
quoting People Ex. Rel. Sea Ins. Co. v. Graves, 274 N.Y. 312, 15 (1937) (The concept of reinsurance 
“dates back to the time the first bookie, fearful that he could not cover all his bets in the event he were to 
lose, decided to spread his risk ‘laying-off’ the risk by getting other bookies to share his exposure.).  
Though colorful, that assessment is not entirely accurate.  The earliest recordings of the use of reinsurance 
likely predated the iteration of the modern bookie and has been historically identified as predating the 17th 
century.  See Graydon S. Staring, The Law of Reinsurance at 1:4, 5-6 (“The earliest recorded instance is 
said to have been a policy written on a voyage from Genoa to Sluys and reinsured for the more hazardous 
portion, from Cardiz to Sluys, the insurer retaining the Mediterranean portion of the risk.”).  The New York 
courts were not altogether mistaken as England likely recognized the relationship between insurance and 
speculation in the 18th Century and prohibited marine reinsurance by the Marine Act of 1745.  Addressing 
that Parliamentary Act, Lord Mansfield noted that, “The statute doubtless was intended to prevent 
gambling. I suppose that the mischief was that policies were underwritten at one premium and reassurance 
affected at another.”  In Re Norwich Equitable Fire Assurance Soc’y 57 LT Rep. 241, 243 (1887). 
 
19
 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law, sec. 140[a], 3rd edition (2002), 1054 (“The 
business of reinsurance has developed some special terminology.”).  See also New Appleman Insurance 
Law Practice Guide, Vol. 3: Separate Lines of Insurance, sec. 40.01 (2007), 5 (“Reinsurance, like many 
areas of business law, has a language of its own.”).   
 
20
 See Couch on Insurance, 3rd edition (2007), sec. 9:2, 6 (“There are two parties to a reinsurance 
agreement, but these parties have been bestowed with multiple names which are used interchangeably and 
are all accurate.”).   
 
21
 See Graydon S. Staring, The Law of Reinsurance, sec. 1:1, 3 (“The original insurer, sometimes called the 
direct, or initial, insurer, and occasionally the primitive insurer, is commonly called the reinsured or, 
especially in England, the reassured.”).   
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reinsured.22  Though that seems clear enough, the original insurer is frequently referred to 
by another more exotic definition, that of cedent.23  This designation stems from the idea 
that the function of reinsurance is for the original insurer to “cede” a certain amount of its 
business to the reinsurer, hence the term cedent.24  Likewise, a reinsurer may itself seek 
reinsurance, called retrocessions, in the same forms and for the same purposes as any 
other insurers.25  Hence, the reinsurer of a reinsurer is often called a retrocessionaire.26   
In a true reinsurance contract,  the risk indemnified is the risk that the insurer will 
have to pay on the underlying insured risk.27  Reinsurance is an aspect of insurance and is 
                                                 
 
22
 See Ostranger & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.01[c], 992 (noting a ceding 
insurer or reinsured is “the insurer that transfers all or a portion of the risk it underwrites to a reinsurer.”).    
 
23
 See Graydon S. Staring, The Law of Reinsurance, sec. 1:1, 3 (“The reinsured is said to cede business to 
the reinsurer, or reassurer, and is therefore also referred to as the ceding company or the cedent (or 
cedant).”).  See also New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide, Vol. 3: Separate Lines of Insurance, 
sec. 40.01 (2007), 5 (“The insurance company purchasing reinsurance is called the ‘ceding company’ (or 
the ‘cedent’ (or ‘cedant’), ‘reinsured’ or ‘ceding insurer’) because it ‘cedes’ or transfers part of the risk.”).   
 
24
 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law, sec. 140[a], 3rd edition (2002), 1054 (“The act of 
transferring the risk is called ‘ceding,’ and the portion of the risk passed to the reinsurer is called the 
‘cession.’”).   
 
25
 The retrocessional agreement, like any other reinsurance agreement, is a contract and will be effective 
according to its terms.  These terms need not mirror the specific risks of the reinsurance agreement which it 
is reinsuring.  As can quickly be deduced, with the expansion of the insuring scenario from one to three or 
more separate agreements, all of which may cover different risks and have different exclusions, the 
resolution of indemnity responsibility can easily become complex.  See Couch on Insurance 9:3, 9-10. 
 
26
 The preponderance of French terminology likely arises from the early statutory action by the French 
Courts in the reinsurance business.  For instance, notice of the 1681 Ordonnance de la Marine of Louis XIV 
provided that: 
 
The insurers may reinsure with others the effects they may have insured, and the insured may 
likewise cause to be insured the premium of insurance, and the solvency of the insurers.   
 
Graydon S. Staring, The Law of Reinsurance at 1:4, 6 (providing translation of Article XX, Title Sixth of 
the 1681 Ordonnance).   
 
27
 Risk is transferred by a variety of financial transactions, not all, or even most of which, constitute 
insurance.  Though insurance itself remains a somewhat elusive definitional concept, the indemnity 
function, particularly when combined with some aspect of fortuity is often seen as core insurance 
principles.  For an excellent discussion of the nature of various financial intermediaries and on the overlap 
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regulated as such.   By entering into a contract to reinsure, the reinsurer agrees to 
indemnify the ceding insurer for any liability incurred by the insurer that is covered by 
the reinsurance agreement.28  Importantly for our later discussions, the liabilities covered 
under a reinsuring agreement frequently extend beyond the cost of losses accrued by the 
cedent insurer’s policyholder under the original policy.29  Examples of other indemnified 
liabilities often include such things as the cost of bringing a declaratory judgment against 
their policyholder and other “expenses” inherent to the cedent insuring company’s 
coverage defense.30 
The reinsurance industry also has traditions and structures unfamiliar to the 
regular cognesti of students of insurance, some of which are important to determining 
reinsurance’s regulatory effect on insurers.  For instance, primary insurance policies treat 
operative standards of interpretation and the financial interests of the parties in a 
somewhat different manner.31  Primarily, these different legal standards stem from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
in definitions for regulatory purpose See generally Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored 
Financial Services Industry:  An Exploratory Essay, 77 Wash U. L. Q. 319 (1999) 
   
28
 Ostrager & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.01, 990. See Travelers Idem. Co. 
v. Scor Reins. Co., 62 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1995).  Reinsurance is a contract for indemnity not one of 
liability. See Transcontiental Underwriters Agency v. American Agency Underwriters, 680 F.2d 298, 299 
n.2 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 
29
 See Couch on Insurance, 3rd edition (2007), sec. 9:24, 67 (“Because the reinsurance agreement is a 
contract of indemnity, the liability of the reinsurer is inextricably tied to the loss of the reinsured.”).   
 
30
 Id at 67-68 (“It is the language of the reinsurance contract that will ultimately determine the extent of the 
reinsurer’s liability to the reinsured.  In other words, the sustaining of a loss by the original insured cannot 
create liability for the reinsurer extending beyond the terms of its contract.”).  Id.  See also Graydon S. 
Staring, The Law of Reinsurance, sec. 15:1, 1 (“It does not necessarily follow that, where the first insurer is 
liable, the reinsurer is also liable.  Whether or not the reinsurer is liable depends upon the terms of the 
contract of reinsurance.”).   
 
31
 See Couch on Insurance, 3rd edition (2007), sec. 9:9, 33-34 (“The fundamental rules or principles 
governing the construction and interpretation of contracts generally apply equally to contracts of 
reinsurance.  The form of the reinsurance contract, while distinctive in nature, is often similar to a contract 
of original insurance.  It is the nature and heightened complexity or sophistication that sets the reinsurance 
contract apart and necessitates its own area of law within the broader context of insurance law.”).   
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greater sophistication of the parties involved and the more complex purposes of 
reinsurance beyond issues of simple indemnity.32 
2. A Brief Taxonomy of Reinsurance  
As reinsurance is a contractual arrangement, the nature, complexity and terms of 
many contracts stray from the standardization common among primary insurance 
policies.33  In fact, because of reinsurance’s remarkable flexibility and its capacity to take 
on a large variety of risk types and risk levels, the policies vary in their purposes and 
specifics.34  The terms of the reinsurance contract and the terms of the policies reinsured 
determines the scope of the indemnity offered by the reinsurer.35  The contracts reflect 
the business needs of sophisticated commercial entities and, as such, the terms, 
conditions and costs of a reinsurance contract are all negotiable.36  However, likely as a 
result of historical development, these policies generally fall into a few recognized 
categories of reinsurance.37  
                                                 
 
32
 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law, sec. 141, 3rd edition (2002), 1056-57 
(“Reinsurance serves several purposes; first, reinsurance permits an insurer to transfer large risks that it is 
unable to manage or that are simply too risky to another insurer.  Second, reinsurance increases an insurer’s 
capacity to write policies.  Third, just as reinsurance enables an insurer to take on new business, 
reinsurance can also be used to enable an insurer to leave a particular kind of business quickly.  A fourth 
purpose of reinsurance is to stabilize insurers’ profits and losses.”).   
 
33
 See Ostranger & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.03[b], 997 (“Reinsurance 
treaties and certificates vary considerably in their language and terms of coverage.”).   
 
34
 Id (“Reinsurance treaties may contain ‘follow the fortunes,’ ‘errors and omissions,’ ‘notice,’ ‘arbitration,’ 
‘claims cooperation,’ ‘salvage and subrogation,’ ‘allocation of expenses,’ ‘extra contractual obligations,’ 
‘punitive damages’ and/or ‘cut through clauses.’  The wording of these clauses in different reinsurance 
certificates and treaties can also vary substantially.”).  Id.  
 
35
 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 806-07 (1993). 
 
36
 See RAA webpage, Who We Are, http://www.reinsurance.org/i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageID=3615 
(“Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the RAA is a non-profit association committed to an activist agenda 
that represents the interests of reinsurance professionals in Congress and in state legislatures.”).     
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A. Facultative Reinsurance 
Facultative reinsurance is the most discrete form of reinsurance, and generally 
accepted as the likely original form of reinsurance.38  Facultative reinsurance contracts 
usually cover individual underlying policies written on a policy-specific basis, although 
facultative “treaties” or book of business policies are not uncommon. 39  Facultative 
reinsurance policies take their name because the contracts allow the reinsurance company 
to use its “faculties” or reason to choose to reinsure a specific risk, a specific policy, or a 
specific group of policies.40  The ceding insurer and reinsurer agree to the terms and 
conditions of each individual contract.41  In these contracts, the reinsurer often conducts 
its own underwriting to determine the appropriate premium level.42  Facultative 
                                                                                                                                                 
37
 See Couch on Insurance, 3rd edition (2007), sec. 9:3, 8 (“There are two broad categories of reinsurance 
agreements: facultative reinsurance and treaty reinsurance.”).   
 
38
 See Graydon S. Staring, The Law of Reinsurance at 1:4, 7-8 (“Facultative reinsurance of a single risk, 
which was undoubtedly the original type, continued dominant until the last half of the Nineteenth Century.  
A treaty, which is a long term contract covering more than one risk, is known to have existed as early as 
1821.  Treaties became common around the beginning of the Twentieth Century and one form, the excess 
of loss treaty, is said to have become widespread as a result of the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 
1906”). 
 
39
  See Unigard Sec. Is. Co. v. North River Is. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993).  Even with facultative 
insurance there are automatic or semi-automatic forms that allow reinsurers to cancel all or parts of the 
risks assumed.  See Compaignie de Reassurace d’ile de Farce v. New England Reinsurance Corp., 57 F.3d 
56, 64-65 and 74-76 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 
40
 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law, sec. 140[b], 3rd edition (2002), 1054 (“Facultative 
reinsurance involves the primary insurer entering into an agreement for the reinsurance of a particular risk.  
The reinsurance can be written on a pro rata or an excess basis; the root word “faculty” denotes that the 
reinsurer has a choice of accepting or rejecting any risk proposed and of demanding whatever premium it 
thinks appropriate.”).  
 
41
 See New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide, Vol. 3: Separate Lines of Insurance, sec. 40.04[1] 
(2007), 16 (“The reinsurer and cedent negotiate the terms for each facultative certificate.”).  See also 
Graydon S. Staring, Law of Reinsurance at 2:2, 3 (“The prospective reinsured, either directly or through a 
broker, presents the direct policy terms, or a summary of them, and the proposal for reinsurance.  If it is 
accepted at a satisfactory premium, a contract is made.  Other terms are negotiated to the satisfaction of 
both parties.”).   
 
42
 See Graydon S. Staring, Law of Reinsurance at 2:6, 7 (“The reinsurer will always have at least a general, 
if not a particular, interest in the integrity of the reinsured’s underwriting and claims practices.”).  See also 
New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide, Vol. 3: Separate Lines of Insurance, sec. 40.04[1] (2007), 
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reinsurance contracts provide reinsurance for the unusual; they also have the greatest 
specific effect on the cost of covering unusual or low-incidence risks.43  Likewise, with 
its ability to allow reinsurers to engage in significant underwriting opportunities, 
facultative reinsurance is often used to cover catastrophic or other low incidence - high 
loss risks.44  Individual risk facultative reinsurance may be used in tandem with the 
second variety of reinsuring agreements, the treaty.45   
B. Treaty Reinsurance 
Treaties are broad agreements that reinsure multiple contracts, often contracts that 
have yet to be written by the direct insurer.46   Usually, treaties cover some portion or 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 (“Facultative reinsurance is commonly purchased for large, unusual or catastrophic risks.  Reinsurers 
thus must have the necessary resources to underwrite individual risks carefully.”).   
 
43
 Id at sec. 2:3, 4 (“Once, no doubt, all reinsurance was facultative.  With the rise of treaties, they account 
for great amounts of reinsurance but facultative reinsurance, which requires individual attention to 
underwriting, remains very important for businesses that fall outside the bounds of a treaty reinsurance 
program.  The reinsured may want to meet competition and enter into new lines in which it has no expertise 
but can gain it through initially taking risks and obtaining facultative reinsurance from those who have 
experience.  The reinsured may need facultative reinsurance where the risk falls under an exclusion in its 
treaties, either as to type or amount, or because the risk, although routine in nature, present a very high loss 
exposure.  In the end, all these uses serve the general purpose of reinsurance to provide stability and 
promote growth.”).  Id.  
 
44
 See Ostranger & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.01[b], 991 (“The 
availability of reinsurance enables an insurer to accept risks that would otherwise be beyond its 
underwriting capacity by allowing the ceding insurer to ‘lay-off’ on reinsurers a portion of the risk of loss.  
Thus, reinsurance enables insurers to spread the risk of catastrophic losses among a larger pool of 
insurers.”).   
 
45
 See New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide, Vol. 3: Separate Lines of Insurance, sec. 40.04[1],  
(2007), 16 (“Insurers sometimes purchase both facultative and treaty reinsurance to cover the same risk.  
Unless there are contract terms to the contrary, the facultative reinsurance will perform first and completely 
before any of the treaty reinsurance performs.  Sometimes the facultative reinsurance only applies to the 
ceding company’s net retention; other times facultative coverage also inures to the benefit of the treaty 
reinsurers.  Ideally, the wording of the facultative certificate will make this clear.”).   
 
46
 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law, sec 140[b], 3rd edition (2002), 1054 (“The 
reinsurer is obligated to accept a portion of all of the risks that meet the requirements agreed to by the 
parties, as opposed to providing reinsurance directly for a particular risk.  The primary insurer may or may 
not be obligated to cede risks.  Provisions exist for renewing or terminating the reinsurance, but the 
distinguishing aspect of the treaty is that a commitment to reinsure exists, which is not the case when 
facultative arrangements are used.  In a treaty reinsurance relationship, there is 1) no individual risk 
scrutiny by the reinsurer, 2) obligatory acceptance by the reinsurer of covered business, and 3) a long-term 
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class of business of the direct insurer and historically may cover a long period of time, 
usually renewable on a fairly automatic basis unless one of the parties seeks a new term.47  
Treaties are particularly useful reinsuring mechanisms since they can be structured to 
reinsure losses on direct insurance which either were written during the term of the treaty 
but occur later, or they can be structured to reinsure losses that occur during the term of 
treaty but were written earlier.48  Likewise, the premiums may be calculated in a variety 
of ways including structuring the reinsurance premium in some way directly related to 
the premiums on the underlying policies or assigning a single sum or some other variable 
amount as the parties wish and which reflect their business purposes.49  Generally 
speaking, the treaty reinsurance contract forms when the original insurer cedes part of the 
premiums for its policies and the risk of losses on those policies to the reinsurer.50  Treaty 
reinsurance usually involves multiple reinsurers taking part of a book of business’ risks, 
with each agreeing to assume a portion of the risk in some pre-determined manner.51 
                                                                                                                                                 
relationship in which the reinsurer’s profitability is expected, but measured and adjusted over an extended 
period of time.”).   
 
47
 Id (“Most reinsurance is treaty reinsurance.  The treaty arrangement, sometimes called “automatic 
reinsurance,” involves a commitment of a reinsurer to assume part of the risk of the primary insurer, either 
on a pro rata or an excess basis, for a stated period.”).  Id.  
 
48
 See Graydon S. Staring, Law of Reinsurance at 2:4, 4-5 (“Depending on its purpose and structure, a 
treaty may reinsure only losses on direct insurance written during its term, or it may reinsure losses 
occurring in that term, although under insurance written earlier.  Depending on the purpose of the reinsured 
and the specialization or business interest of the reinsurer, it may be written on one or more particular 
classes of the reinsured’s business, or parts of them, or on the results of its business as a whole.”).   
 
49
 Id at 5 (“Depending again on its structure and purpose, the premiums may be directly related to the 
premiums on the underlying insurance or may be lump sums, or variable amounts, not based on direct 
participation in the underlying premiums.”).  Id.  
 
50
 See Ostrager & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.03[a], 996 (“The reinsurer, 
under a single contract, agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer with respect to an entire ‘book’ of the ceding 
insurer’s underwriting activities for designated lines of insurance.  A treaty reinsurance contract is formed 
when the primary insurer cedes part of the premiums for its policies and the losses on those policies to a 
reinsurer.”).   
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Importantly, reinsurance treaties cover all risks written by the reinsured that fall 
within their terms unless specifically excluded.52  For this reason, treaty reinsurers 
generally do not review the individual risks underlying the treaty and do not conduct their 
own underwriting of the risks.53  Rather, they rely on the underwriting experience of the 
original insurer with a prudent reinsurer investigating the underwriting philosophy, loss 
experience, attitude towards claims management and other business practices.54  
Facultative reinsurance can be combined with treaty reinsurance to cover exclusions in 
the treaty or for other business purposes, some of which we explore later.55  
C. The Verticals and Horizontals of Reinsurance:  Pro-rata and Excess of Loss 
Again, we recognize along with the United States Supreme Court that:  
In indemnity reinsurance . . . [the reinsurer] agrees to indemnify, or reimburse, the ceding 
company for a specified percentage of the claims and expenses attributable to claims that 
have been reinsured.56   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
51
 Id (“Arrangements typically involve the participation of numerous reinsurers, each agreeing to assume a 
percentage of the total liability under a single treaty.”).  Id.  
 
52
 See New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide, Vol. 3: Separate Lines of Insurance, sec. 40.04[1] 
(2007), 17 (“Reinsurance treaties cover all of the risks written by the ceding insurer that fall within their 
terms unless exposures are specifically excluded.  Thus, in most cases, neither the cedent nor the reinsurer 
has the ‘faculty’ to exclude from a treaty a risk that fits within the treaty terms.”).   
 
53
 Id (“Treaty reinsurers rely heavily on the cedent’s underwriting.”).  Id.  
 
54
 See RAA webpage, Fundamentals of Property Casualty Reinsurance (“While treaty reinsurance does not 
require review of individual risks by the reinsurer, it demands a careful review of the underwriting 
philosophy, practice and historical experience of the ceding insurer, including a thoughtful evaluation of 
the company’s attitude toward claims management, engineering control, as well as the management’s 
general background, expertise and planned objectives.”).   
 
55
 See Footnote 46.  
 
56
 Colonial American Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 491 U.S. at 247. See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 
v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 806-07 (1993).  
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The insured’s indemnification by the reinsured need not be total or complete.57  In 
fact, the ability of reinsurers to take only a portion of a risk or book of risks is one of the 
particularly useful risk spreading-elements of reinsurance.58  There is nothing to prevent a 
single reinsurer from taking all indemnity responsibility for a policy or group of policies, 
but most reinsuring agreements take responsibility for only a portion of those losses.59  
Traditionally, the responsibilities divide into two basic divisional structures most easily 
visualized as either a vertical or horizontal slicing up of the losses from particular risks 
assumed.60  Both facultative and treaty reinsurance can be written in either a pro-rata or 
excess of loss basis.61 
                                                 
57
 See RAA webpage, Fundamentals of Property Casualty Reinsurance (“Reinsurance is a transaction in 
which one insurance company indemnifies, for a premium, another insurance company against all or part of 
the loss that it may sustain under its policy or policies of insurance.”).   
 
58
 Id (“The fundamental objective of insurance, to spread the risk so that no single entity finds itself saddled 
with a financial burden beyond its ability to pay, is enhanced by reinsurance.”).  Id.  See also New 
Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide, Vol. 3: Separate Lines of Insurance, sec.40.01 (2007), 6 
(“Reinsurance relationships can be simple or complex.  A cedent can cede certain loss exposures under one 
contract or purchase several contracts covering different aspects or portions of the same policy to achieve 
the desired degree of coverage.  A layering process involving two or more reinsurance agreements is 
commonly employed to obtain sufficient monetary limits of reinsurance protection.  When a claim is 
presented, the reinsurers respond in a predetermined order to cover the loss.”).   
 
59
 See Couch on Insurance, 3rd edition (2007), sec. 9:1, 3-4 (“Reinsurance is a contract whereby one insurer 
transfers or ‘cedes’ to another insurer all or part of the risk it has assumed under a separate or distinct 
policy or group of policies in exchange for a portion of the premium.”).   
 
60
 See RAA webpage, Fundamentals of Property Casualty Reinsurance (“Reinsurance may be written on 
either a proportional basis or excess of loss basis.  A reinsurance contract written on a proportional basis 
simply prorates all premiums, losses and expenses between the insurer and the reinsurer on a pre-arranged 
basis.  The proportional approach is used extensively in property reinsurance.  Excess of loss contracts, on 
the other hand, require the primary insurer to keep all losses up to a predetermined level of retention, and 
the reinsurer to reimburse the company for any losses above that level of retention, up to the limits of the 
reinsurance contract.  In simplest terms, a retention is analogous to the deductible a policyholder may have 
on a personal insurance policy, such as an automobile or homeowner’s policy.”).   
 
61
 See Ostrager & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.03[a], 996 (“Both treaty 
reinsurance and facultative reinsurance can be written on either a pro-rata or excess-of-loss basis.  Treaty 
reinsurance involves an ongoing agreement between two insurers, binding in advance one to cede and the 
other to accept specified business that is the subject of the treaty.  Facultative reinsurance is negotiated with 
respect to a specific risk insured by a particular policy or policies.”).  See also RAA webpage, 
Fundamentals of Property Casualty Reinsurance.   
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i) Pro-Rata treaties 
If a reinsurer does not want indemnification responsibility for an entire risk 
classification or group of policies, it can structure the treaty to take on only a specific 
portion of each risk to which it applies.62  Using a pro-rata reinsurance contract, the 
reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer for a percentage of original risk losses in 
exchange for a corresponding portion of the premium.63  Generally, pro-rata agreements 
obligate the reinsurer to indemnify an insurer without requiring any retention by the 
reinsured.64  Commonly, this type of pro-rata arrangement is called Quota Share 
Reinsurance, where the ceding company indemnifies the cedent insurer for a fixed 
percentage of loss on all policies of a defined risk type.65  This easily visualized 
apportionment can become somewhat more complex in that a “pro-rata” treaty can also 
be horizontally segmented within each “slice” by requiring the ceding insurer to retain 
some portion of the loss with the reinsurer only responsible for the surplus.66  This type 
                                                 
62
 See RAA webpage, Fundamentals of Property Casualty Reinsurance (“Under proportional reinsurance, 
the ceding insurer and the reinsurer automatically share all premiums and losses covered by the contract on 
a pre-agreed basis, thus there are no characteristics uniquely attributable to the risk associated with 
proportional reinsurance.”).   
 
63
 See Ostrager & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.02[a], 993 (“Pursuant to a 
pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer for a percentage of any 
losses from the original risk in return for a corresponding portion of the premium for the original risk.”).   
 
64
 See Ott v. All-Star Ins. Corp., 99 Wisc. 2d 635, 643; Central Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Devonshire Coverage 
Corp., 426 F. Supp. 7, 11 n. 5, 21 (D. Neb. 1976), aff’d in part and remanded, 565 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1977).  
See also Ostrager & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.02[a], 993 (“Pro-rata 
reinsurance arrangements generally obligate the reinsurer to pay a proportion of any losses that occur with 
no retention by the reinsured.”).   
 
65
 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law at §140[b], 1054 (“Pro rata reinsurance, sometimes 
called ‘quota share’ reinsurance, means that losses, premiums, and expenses are divided pro rata by the 
primary insurer and the reinsurer.  For example, the primary insurer may retain sixty percent of the risk and 
transfer forty percent.  If any loss occurs, whether large or small, the primary insurer is liable for sixty 
percent of the loss and the reinsurer is liable for forty percent.”).  See also Ostrager & Newman, Handbook 
on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.02[a], 993 (noting quota share reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding 
insurer for a fixed percentage of loss for all policies of a defined type written by the ceding company.”).   
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of pro-rata reinsuring up to the amount of insurance originally written, minus the ceding 
insurer’s retention is commonly called Surplus Share Reinsurance.67  With the entrance 
of additional retrocessionaires there can be quite a bit of segmentation in this surplus line.   
Another interesting aspect of pro-rata treaties is the reinsured’s obligation to 
automatically accept its portion of the risks insured.68  Pro-rata treaties come in a variety 
of broad types, knowledge of each of which is useful for our later discussion.  First, the 
treaty can be pro-rata and obligatory.69  Through this structure, all risks in a specified 
category are shared automatically by some proportion agreed to.70  The second type, 
however, is more interesting because it is only semi-automatic and contains a facultative 
component.71  Best defined as a facultative obligatory treaty, the obligation stays with the 
reinsurer to accept the ceded business that it selected by its reinsured.72  Alternatively, 
                                                                                                                                                 
66
 Id  at 1055 (“A special kind of pro rata reinsurance is ‘surplus reinsurance.’  Under surplus reinsurance, 
the reinsurer agrees to cover a share of the risk that varies with the size of the exposure.  For example, the 
treaty might specify that losses under $50,000 are covered in full by the primary insurer, that the first 
$50,000 of losses between $50,000 and $250,000 is paid by the direct insurer and the rest by the reinsurer, 
and that losses exceeding $250,000 are paid 20 percent by the direct insurer and 80 percent by the 
reinsurer.”).  Id.  
 
67
 See Ostrager and Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.02[a], 993 (noting surplus 
share reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding insurer for a fixed percentage of loss for all policies of a defined 
type written by the ceding company.”).   
 
68
 See New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide, Vol. 3: Separate Lines of Insurance, sec.40.04[2] 
(2007), 18 (“Proportional or pro-rata reinsurance is characterized by a proportional division of liability and 
premium between the ceding company and the reinsurer.”).   
 
69
 Id (“The cedent pays the reinsurer a predetermined share of the premium, and the reinsurer indemnifies 
the cedent for a like share of the loss and the expense incurred by the cedent in its defense and settlement of 
claims (the ‘allocated loss adjustment expense’ or ‘LAE’”).  Id.  
 
70
 Id (“According to the percentage agreed, the cedent and reinsurer share the premium and losses from the 
business reinsured.”).  Id.  
 
71
 See Ostrager and Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.03[a], 997 (“Semi-
automatic reinsurance, or ‘automatic facultative reinsurance,’ is a variation of facultative reinsurance which 
enables a ceding company to cede to the reinsurer specific risks, which are assumed by the reinsurer for a 
predetermined permoim, unless the insurer declines the risk within a stipulated time period.”).   
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there exists the truly facultative treaty in which neither the reinsured nor the reinsurer is 
obligated to cede or accept the risks, both are free to accept or decline.73  Pro-rata treaties 
often allocate a portion of the original premium to the reinsurer.74 By this mechanism a 
reinsurer which may not have been nor sought to be directly interested in the original 
insurer’s premium calculations now acquires a more direct interest in their reinsured’s 
underwriting decisions.75   
iii) Excess of Loss Reinsurance 
In the excess of loss reinsurance scenario, the reinsurer’s obligation is defined in 
relation to the reinsured’s retention.76  In this structure the reinsurer, subject to specific 
stated limits of coverage, indemnifies the reinsured for all or a stated portion of losses in 
excess of the agreed upon retention. 77   The agreements can be structured so that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
72
 Id (“A ‘semi-automatic’ reinsurance facility differs from an ‘automatic’ one in that, under the former, the 
reinsurer has retained the right to cancel any individual risk it does not want to accept, while under the 
latter, the reinsurer has the right to cancel the entire facility.”).  Id.  
 
73
 Likewise, pro-rata share treaties can be subdivide into quota share treaties and surplus share treaties.  
Quota share treaties allow the reinsurer to take a specified percentage of the premiums charged in 
proportion to its percentage of the risk assumed, all within agreed upon upper limits of liability.  Surplus 
share treaties are distinct in that the reinsurer does not participate until the loss reaches a specific level, 
after which they are liable on a fixed percentage basis, within limits, and for a percentage of the premiums.   
 
74
 See Ostrager and Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.02[a], 993 (“Pursuant to a 
pro-rata reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurer for a percentage of any 
losses from the original risk in return for a corresponding portion of the premium for the original risk.  Pro-
rata reinsurance arrangements generally obligate the reinsurer to pay a proportion of any losses that occur 
with no retention by the reinsured.”).   
 
75
 See Graydon S. Staring, Law of Reinsurance at 2:2, 4 (“Whether the contract is pro rata or excess, the 
reinsured will…be expected ordinarily to retain a sufficient amount of the risk to give the reinsurer 
confidence that the policy will be well administered.”).   
 
76
 See Ostrager and Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.02[b], 993 (“Excess of loss 
reinsurance indemnifies the ceding insurer, subject to specified limits, for all or a stated portion of loss in 
excess of a state retention.”).   
 
77
 See Compagnie de Reassurance d’Ile de Farce v. New England Reins. Corp., 944 F. Supp. 986, 998 n.17 
(D. Mass 1996).   
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reinsurance can be excess to the specific risk, specific occurrence, an aggregate dollar 
amount or specified loss ratio.78  
2. Purposes of Reinsurance 
A comprehensive review of all the reasons an insurer may seek to reinsure is not 
possible or necessary for the purposes of this Essay.  Suffice it to say that as reinsurance 
is a flexible medium and supports a variety of functions, the purpose of acquiring it will 
differ in accordance with the business interests of the insurer seeking it.79  Likewise, as 
reinsurance serves a variety of purely financial and accounting purposes, reinsurance may 
be employed for purposes slightly beyond the scope of this Essay’s interest in its 
potential regulatory effects on insurance companies as insuring companies, rather than as 
financial institutions.  Regardless, in accordance with our focus on the potential effects of 
reinsurance on primary insurers, it is useful to review the four main purposes for which 
reinsurance is generally sought in relation to the primary insurer’s insurance function.80  
A.  Risk Allocation 
For some purposes, reinsurance serves the almost identical purpose for the 
reinsured insurance company as that of many other common commercial insurances.  
Thus, reinsurance’s initial purpose may be viewed as a basic reallocation of risk and as an 
                                                 
78
 See Ostrager & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes at 15.02[b], 994 (noting per risk or 
specific excess reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding insurer, subject to a specified limit, against the amount 
of loss in excess of a specified retention with respect to each risk covered by a reinsurance arrangement”; 
per occurrence reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding insurer, subject to a specified limit, against the amount 
of loss in excess of a specified retention with respect to each occurrence”; aggregate excess of loss 
reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding insurer for the amount by which the ceding insurer’s loss during a 
specified period exceeds either (a) a specific dollar amount or (b) a percentage of the company’s subject 
premium”; and stop loss reinsurance “indemnifies the ceding insurer for losses in excess of a specified loss 
ratio up to a predetermined loss ratio limit.”).   
 
79
 See RAA webpage, Fundamentals of Property Casualty Reinsurance (“Depending on the ceding 
company’s goals, different types of reinsurance contracts are available to bring about the desired result.”).   
 
80
 Id (Insurers purchase reinsurance for essentially four reasons: (1) to limit liability on specific risks; (2) to 
stabilize loss experience; (3) to protect against catastrophes; and (4) to increase capacity.”).  Id.  
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additional way to spread risk.81  Just as any commercial entity might enter the insurance 
market seeking indemnity for specific types of loss, so too does the insurer seek a 
mechanism to transfer the risk it chose to underwrite to another party.82  In a reinsurance 
situation, the risk acquired by the ceding insurer transfers to the reinsurer to the extent 
and within the limits of the negotiated contract; to the extent that those risks are allocated 
among numerous reinsurers, the risk is even further spread. 83  
This risk transfer benefits the insurer by allowing the reinsured to take action that 
might otherwise be prohibited or disallowed sans reinsurance.84  For instance, through the 
medium of reinsurance, the ceding insurer can underwrite business that it might 
otherwise could not have.85  Either the risk itself may simply be too large or the risk of 
loss might be in some other way unusual.86  By limiting their loss exposure through 
reinsurance, the reinsured can offer higher coverage limits than they could otherwise 
                                                 
 
81
 Id (“By providing a mechanism through which insurers limit their loss exposure to levels commensurate 
with their net assets, reinsurance enables insurance companies to offer coverage limits considerably higher 
than they could otherwise provide.”).  Id.  
 
82
 See Kemper Reins. Co. v. Corcora (In re Midland Ins. Co.), 79 N.Y.2d 253, 258 (1992).  
 
83
 See RAA webpage, Fundamentals of Property Casualty Reinsurance, Importantly, it must be remembered 
that reinsurance does not actually lessen total risk exposure: 
 
In any discussion of reinsurance, the limitations must be considered along with 
its advantages.  Reinsurance does not change the nature of a risk being insured.  
It cannot make a bad risk insurable or an exposure more predictable or desirable.  
And while reinsurance may limit an insurance company’s exposure to a risk, the 
total risk exposure is not altered through the use of reinsurance. 
 
84
 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law at §141, 1056 (“Reinsurance permits an insurer to 
transfer large risks that it is unable to manage or that are simply too risky to another insurer.”).   
 
85
  Id (“For example, an insurer that has a portfolio of coverage faces the risk that a large number of small 
losses or an unexpected, unexceptional nature may occur, thereby exceeding the insurer’s capacity to pay 
for them without suffering a loss.  For…[this] risk, an insurer can seek reinsurance to protect against [this] 
contingency.”).  Id.  
 
86
  Id (“The insurer faces the risk that a single catastrophic event, the precise timing of which is uncertain 
(e.g., an earthquake) may occur with devastating consequences to the insurer’s balance sheet.  For…[this] 
risk, an insurer can seek reinsurance to protect against [this] contingencies.”).  Id.  
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afford.87  Through this mechanism, smaller insurers have the capacity to compete with 
larger companies and offer their policyholders a broader array of coverage options.88 
Likewise, the insurer may want to enter business lines that present the possibility 
of some future unexpected losses the insurer is unwilling to retain beyond a specific 
retention.89  Either the possibility of a very great a number of small, unexpected losses or 
the possibility of a single, catastrophic loss which could overwhelm the insurer’s balance 
sheet might cause a prudent insurer to acquire reinsurance to offset the risk of loss.90  
This prudential risk-transferring purpose of reinsurance appropriately causes reinsuring 
even though the insurer believes (as it must) that its underwriting decisions are prudent 
                                                 
 
87
 See RAA webpage, Fundamentals of Property Casualty Reinsurance (“In calculating an appropriate level 
of reinsurance, a company takes into account the amounts of its own available surplus, and determines its 
level of retention based on the amount of loss it can absorb financially.  Surplus, sometimes referred to as 
policyholders’ surplus, is the amount by which the assets of an insurer exceed its liabilities.  A company’s 
retention may range anywhere from a few thousand dollars to one million dollars or more.  The loss 
exposure above the retention, up to the policy limits of the reinsurance contract, is indemnified by the 
reinsurer.  In this manner, reinsurance helps to stabilize loss experience on individual risks, as well as on 
accumulated losses under many policies occurring during a specified period.”).   
 
88
 See RAA webpage, Fundamentals of Property Casualty Reinsurance (noting reinsurance’s goal of 
limiting liability “is crucial because it allows all companies, large and small, to offer coverage limits to 
meet their policyholders’ needs.  In this manner, reinsurance provides an avenue for small-to-medium size 
companies to compete with industry giants.”).   
 
89
 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law at §141, 1056-57 (“Just as reinsurance enables an 
insurer to take on new business, reinsurance can also be used to enable an insurer to leave a particular kind 
of business quickly.  An insurer that wants to rid itself of a particular kind of coverage can solicit 
reinsurance for all of the insurance the carrier has written, which effectively takes the insurer out of the 
business and makes the reinsurer the insurer for all of the risks.”).   
 
90
 Id at 1056 (“When the primary insurer purchases reinsurance, it reduces the size of its potential losses, 
which reduces the size of the reserves it must maintain.  Insurers, however, are not as interested in reducing 
reserves as they are in increasing their business.  An insurer with the minimum allowable level of reserves 
and surplus (the amount an insurer is required to maintain in excess of reserves to meet unexpected losses) 
could not take on new business or enter new fields.  However, reinsurance provides a solution: the insurer 
could write the coverage, transfer the risk to a reinsurer, and receive a commission from the reinsurer.  The 
primary insurer adds no new liabilities, but its surplus increases by the amount of the commission.  This 
increased surplus enables the primary insurer to write and retain additional coverage.  Another way to view 
this transaction is that some of the excess capacity of the reinsurer is utilized by the business-garnering 
efforts of the primary insurer; in essence some excess capacity is transferred from the reinsurer to the 
primary insurer.  For the small insurer who wants to grow, reinsurance is an important way to take on new 
business beyond its means and simultaneously increase its capacity.”).  Id.  
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and the premium appropriate.  After all, imprudent underwriting could well be a defense 
to reinsurance coverage.91  Still, even the most perspicacious of underwriters cannot 
foresee the unexpected; thus the prudential purpose of reinsurance. 
B.  Reserve Requirements 
A second purpose for reinsurance, one particularly importantly in the insurance 
regulatory context, is using reinsurance to reduce the amount of reserves an insurer must  
maintain, thus freeing the insurer up to write more policies.92  In purchasing reinsurance, 
the primary reduces the size of its potential losses, which allows it to reduce its 
statutorily-mandated reserves.93  Hence, if a primary insurer hit the threshold for the 
minimum allowable level of reserves plus surplus that it is statutorily required to 
maintain, it would be restricted in the amount of new business open to it.  If the primary 
insurer purchased reinsurance, the primary would still be able to write new policies so 
long as it could transfer the risk to the reinsurer.94  In fact, since the reinsurer swaps the 
                                                 
91
 See Couch on Insurance, 3rd edition (2007), sec. 9:31, 80-81 (“The duty of good faith that runs between 
the parties to a reinsurance contract is essential to the reinsurance relationship. Stemming from the 
reinsurer’s need to rely upon and not duplicate the reinsured’s efforts in properly evaluating risks and 
handling claims, and reducing costs for both parties to the reinsurance contract.  Due to these specific needs 
of the industry, the duty of utmost good faith in this context connotes a higher duty than the ordinary duty 
of good faith that is inherent in general contract law.  Accordingly, it requires that the reinsured must 
disclose to the reinsurer all material facts which may affect the subject risk.  The failure of a reinsured to 
disclose material facts to the reinsurer will warrant the rescission of a reinsurance contract.”).   
 
92
 See Kemper Reins. Co. v. Corcoran (In re Midland Ins. Co.), 79 N.Y.2d 255, 258 (1992) (noting 
reinsurance allows “a primary insurer to reduce the amount of legally required reserves held for the 
protection of policyholders, and to increase the company’s ability to underwrite other policies or make 
other investments”).  
 
93
 See footnote 91.   
 
94
 See footnote 91.  See also RAA webpage, Fundamentals of Property Casualty Reinsurance (“When an 
insurance company issues a policy, the expenses associated with issuing that policy, such as taxes, agent 
commissions, and administrative expenses, are charged immediately against the company’s income, 
resulting in a decrease in surplus.  Meanwhile, the premium collected must be set aside in an unearned 
premium reserve to be recognized as income over a period of time.  This accounting procedure allows for 
strong solvency regulation; however, it ultimately leads to decreased capacity.  As an insurance company 
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new risk in exchange for a commission, the primary insurer is frequently seen as 
acquiring no new liabilities, while its surplus is viewed as increasing by the amount of the 
reinsurer’s commission.95  The majority of public regulation of reinsurers, such as it is, 
concerns itself with this aspect of the reinsuring relationship.96   
C. Risk Exits and Fronting 
A third commonly accepted purpose of reinsurance allows the primary insurer to 
not write more policies.97  An insurer which seeks to exit a certain risk stream can be 
relieved of the risks of loss from those policies and exit that insurance market via 
appropriate reinsurance.98  This allows a certain amount of flexibility to insurers by 
allowing them to shift direction in their future business choices.99   
A few caveats are necessary here.  By reinsuring the entire loss, the primary 
insurer generally has not freed itself from its direct responsibilities to its policyholders, 
despite the 100% risk transfer to the reinsuring companies.  In other words, though it may 
have successfully transferred the risks of loss, it did not transfer its servicing 
responsibilities to the reinsurer.  Again, reinsurance is generally defined as a secondary 
indemnity agreement and the reinsurer does not usually assume a direct claims handling 
                                                                                                                                                 
sells more policies, it must pay more expenses from its surplus.  Therefore, the company’s ability to write 
additional business is reduced.”).   
95
 See footnote 91.  
 
96
 Since reserves are the primary way public regulators attempt to reduce the risk of insurer insolvency and 
default, a great amount of activity has occurred amongst and between regulators to devise statutory 
schemes which allow for protection of the reserves.  There has been some very interesting work on 
reinsurer chartering and on bonding requirements for foreign insurers reinsuring domestic primaries.   
 
97
 See footnote 90.  
 
98
 See footnote 90. 
 
99
 See footnote 90. 
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relationship with the policyholders of the reinsured.100  Reinsuring agreements can 
include “cut-out” provisions, which allow a direct action by the policyholders against the 
reinsurer; provisions like these change the reinsuring relationship.101  
One benefit to the reinsurer role instead of the insurer role is that the reinsurer is 
generally free from this type of direct original policyholder action.  For this reason, the 
standards of contract performance and the mutual obligations of the reinsured and 
reinsurer differ in type and structure from that of policyholder and insurer.  Some of these 
relationships and the differences of obligations are described in Section III of this Essay.  
Too much direct interaction by the reinsurer and the original policyholder will force the 
reinsurer to be treated simply as an insurer of the policyholder, obviating some of the 
benefits and performance obligations associated with the reinsuring agreement, usually to 
the reinsurer’s detriment.  Likewise, though there is nothing to prevent the kind of direct 
assumption of the primary insurer’s role, such a situation really is better understood as a 
novation of the original primary insurance policies, rather the type of reinsurance 
agreement for business agility that is the more common purpose of seeking reinsurance 
for indemnity purposes.  
Another brief caveat is also useful here.  Placing reinsurance for 100% of a 
certain type of underwriting business for the purpose of exiting the business is likewise 
different from another type of 100% reinsuring agreement that displays certain similar 
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characteristics.  In “fronting agreements”, an insurer will enter into a policy with the 
understanding that another party, a reinsurer, will be responsible for the entire amount 
that it is required to pay under the policy.102  One New York court described a fronting 
company as “an insurer that issued the policy on the risk and then reinsured 100% of that 
risk by placing portions of the coverage with various reinsurance carriers”.103  The 
purpose of these “fronting agreements” is to allow a reinsurer not qualified or licensed to 
do business in the state, the opportunity to profit from the sale of insurance transactions 
in that state.104  Generally, the licensed insurer will receive a fee for acting as the 
“front”.105  Despite the slightly pejorative terms used in this arrangement, there is nothing 
illegal in a domestic insurer acting as a front for the unlicensed insurer.  In fact, so long 
as all other regulatory goals are met, these relationships can allow for a significant 
increase in insurance capacity for the state.106  
D.  Loss Stability  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, reinsurance is a mechanism for insurers to 
stabilize their profits and expected losses.107  Insurance does and always has concerned 
                                                 
 
102
 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver, Inc., 224 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing a fronting agreement 
as a “well established ad perfectly legal scheme” where policies are issued by state-licensed insurance 
companies and then immediately reinsured to 100 percent of face value).   
 
103
 Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Excess Ins. Co., 970 F. Supp. 265, 267 n.2 (SDNY 1997). 
 
104
 See Union Sav. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. North Central Life Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. 481 (S. D.  Miss. 1993). 
 
105
 See Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker, 271 N.J. Super. 459, 463-64 (1994). 
 
106
 See New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide, Vol. 3: Separate Lines of Insurance, sec. 40.04[5], 
26 (2007) (“A licensed reinsurer can front for an unauthorized reinsurer or a reinsurance syndicate, to 
permit the ceding insurer to take credit for the reinsurance without need for security.”).   
 
107
 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law at §141, 1057 (“A fourth purpose of reinsurance 
is to stabilize insurers’ profits and losses.”).   
 25 
risk.108  Using reinsurance, the primary insurer can set a limit on its exposure by 
facultative insurance for any given risk, use a surplus treaty to create a ceiling on 
aggregate loss or determine its percentage of risk retained through a pro-rata 
arrangement.109  In this way, even cumulative losses can be restricted to designated 
limits.110  The insurer uses reinsurance as a form of stability control, enabling them to 
fulfill their obligations to policyholders in a continuous manner111 and assisting them 
stabilize their profits.112 
III. Reinsurance as Regulator? 
“Regulation” commonly evokes thoughts of governmental action and visions of 
the regulatory state.  For good or ill, thoughts of regulation links with thoughts of state 
power.  Yet such a restrictive vision of regulation is simplistic and ignores the capacity of 
private institutions to regulate the activities of large swaths of social actors.  To be fair, 
the sophisticated politician or legislator is well aware of this capacity and much of the 
ideological discourse of the last few decades concerns the question of private, rather than 
public actors as best regulator. 
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Insurance has been a battleground issue for the regulatory debate, both as a 
subject for regulation and in its ability to regulate.  Insurance’s dual status is one of the 
reasons the insurance regulation, be it health, property or liability is so frequently central 
to some of the greatest political debates of our time.  Yet, insurance’s ability to regulate 
rarely receives recognition or discussion in policy debates.  Despite this, a fascinating 
body of literature on insurance exists allowing us to examine the myriad ways private or 
quasi-private insurance can regulate private behavior.  With the concept of power not 
limited to overt government action alone, insurance takes its place among regulators of 
social behaviors with surprising force and scope.  Indeed, it has been stated that “looking 
at twentieth century governance, it is tempting to see insurance as the sleeping giant of 
power.” 113 
Identifying insurance as a regulator stems from the idea that insurance works as a 
mechanism to set social standards..  Much scholarship exists on the concept of insurance 
as gatekeeper of many economic activities, from buying a home to driving a car to 
executing a complex financial transaction.  For instance, some of this regulatory effect 
results from direct delegation of state power mandating the purchase of insurance as a 
prerequisite to operating a car or entering certain businesses.  Even without compulsion, 
acquiring insurance may be viewed as a form of “private legislation” within the regime of 
traditional notions of liberal governance.   Particularly relevant to the discussion of 
reinsurance as regulator is the body of work which highlights the capacity of contracting 
behavior which results in social control.  The fascinating work by Tom Baker on the 
genealogy of moral hazard and the path-breaking sociological studies of Carol Heimer on 
the capacity of insurers’ contractual “control” of behavior each greatly assist in 
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identifying insurance as a source of regulatory control over private life.114  Thus, the 
thesis of this Essay; as insurance regulates of policyholder actions, reinsurance regulates 
insurer actions. 
1. Reinsurance and Industry Standards 
Each industry has its own standards and practices.  Most people, even people who 
interact daily with the various professions do not spend too much time pondering how an 
industry came to act the way it does.  Yet, understanding why industries and 
organizations act in a given manner  provides any who choose to study them a rich, in-
depth understanding of their topic.  In all types of commercial transactions, the governing 
doctrines of law (with their judicial enforcement of, or release from, certain obligations) 
enshrined certain processes and practices.  These governing doctrines of law also create 
expectations on the parts of consumers who interact with those businesses, without their 
even being aware of the legal doctrines which spawned them.  How many buyers are 
actually aware of the Uniform Commercial Codes’ treatment of warranties of quality and 
exceptions thereto when purchasing a good?  Yet, it is common practice to mark and 
common knowledge to understand the meaning of a sign scrawled on a television “As 
Is”.   
Reinsurance contracts are subject to specialized doctrines of law, with long 
traditions of application to reciprocal performance obligations.115  Courts  reviewing  
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these doctrines and their effect clauses interpret them to require behavior or risk release 
from the reinsurer’s obligation; this information helps one understand reinsurance’s effect 
on insurance industry practices.  Also interesting is an examination of how the rules came 
about and the extent they inform reinsurance’s economic viability. 
A. Reinsurance and Underwriting Standards116 
One of the strangest aspects of reinsurance is the often overlooked question of 
how reinsurance could ever exist without becoming cost prohibitive.  If one were to 
simply think about reinsurance in terms of risk assessment, there seems little way that the 
addition of multiple new players in the insuring process would not add and continue 
adding to the cost of insurance.  After all, due diligence is an expensive proposition.  
How could all these different reinsurance institutions capably evaluate the true risks of all 
the policies which they agree to reinsure, particularly in the treaty context, without 
accruing costs as large as, if not larger than, the original insurer?117  The answer is simply 
that in the reinsurance treaty context they simply do not engage in that kind of 
investigation, instead they rely on the underwriting skills of their reinsureds.118  
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Investigation costs are limited to delving into the potential reinsured’s loss experiences, 
underwriting skills and claims handling competence.119 
How is action like that considered prudent?  As we have seen to our great dismay 
in the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the consequences of opaque risk acquisition can be 
remarkably severe.  In reinsurance, the doctrine of utmost good faith or uberrima fides 
obviates this problem.120  This duty requires, “the most abundant good faith; absolute and 
perfect candor or openness and honesty; [including] the absence of any concealment or 
deception, however slight”.121  Viewing utmost good faith as appropriately sufficient to  
govern trillions of dollars of transactions is interesting in and of itself, yet, as the Second 
Circuit has noted, it is the core relationship that allows for reinsuring to profitably occur.  
As they explained: 
 
Historically, the reinsurance market has relied on a practice of the exercise 
of good faith to decrease monitoring costs and ex ante contracting costs.  
Reinsurance works only if the sums of reinsurance premiums are less than 
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the original insurance premium.  Otherwise, the ceding insurer will not 
reinsure.  For the reinsurance premiums to be less reinsurers cannot 
duplicate the costly but necessary efforts of the primary insurer in 
evaluating risks and handling claims. . . . Reinsurers are protected, 
however, by a large area of common interest with ceding insurers and by 
the tradition of utmost good faith, particularly in the sharing of 
information.122 
 
In other words, in exchange for placing the reinsurance at a price less than the 
original premiums, the reinsurer is allowed to rely on the good faith of the reinsured.123  
In order for treaty reinsurance to function economically, the reinsurer cannot duplicate 
the underwriting functions engaged in by insurers at the time they placed the original 
coverage.124   
However, that does not mean the reinsurer does not take an interest in the 
underwriting activities of its reinsureds.  As explained by the Reinsurance Association of 
America: 
While treaty reinsurance does not require review of individual risks by the 
reinsurer, it demands careful review of the underwriting philosophy, 
practice and historical experience of the ceding insurer, including a 
thoughtful evaluation of the company’s attitude toward claims 
management, engineering control, as well as the management’s general 
background, expertise and planed objectives.125   
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Keeping these criteria in mind, it is difficult to imagine insurance companies 
would not create and institutionalize underwriting practices that are most likely to attract 
reinsurers if they want to benefit from reinsurance.126  Particularly for smaller insurance 
companies dependant on reinsurance to take on the larger risks, it would not be beneficial 
to adopt underwriting practices which stray too far from the industry’s accepted norm.127  
Should such a company attempt it, undoubtedly the company would have to charge 
higher premiums in order to entice reinsurers to take on their risks.  Likewise, those 
companies which require greater amounts of reinsurance to adhere with their reserve 
requirements would also be prohibited from adopting broader or unusual underwriting 
procedures.   
On the one hand, reinsurers’ interest in the underwriting procedures of those they 
reinsure undoubtedly serves the pseudo-regulatory function of encouraging sound 
underwriting practices by rewarding those companies with greater access to reinsurance.  
On the other hand, such policies likely result in a certain inhibition of experimentation in 
underwriting practices.  Obviously, should one company or group of companies exhibit to 
the reinsurers that its underwriting practices result in a better loss history, over time this 
could result in greater reinsurer interest in that company.  However, during the period of 
time where the practice could be deemed “unusual” the practice could be detrimental to 
reinsurance access.  Ironically, this would likely allow the larger insurance companies 
take the lead as the most willing to experiment with underwriting practices as they have 
the best ability to mitigate any increased reinsurance costs associated with their efforts.  
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Facultative reinsurance mitigates the effect of the phenomena of the unusual risk 
costing more than the easily forecastable risk.128  Again, it is through facultative 
reinsurance that an insurer could acquire reinsurance for a specific risk, a specific policy 
or a specific group of policies.129  It is for this reason that facultative reinsurance “usually 
covers catastrophic or unusual risks”.130  Facultative reinsurance, however, will likely be 
more expensive per risk than broader treaty reinsurance because with facultative 
reinsurance the reinsurer often employs “substantial personnel and technical resources” to 
underwrite those risks.131  Treaty reinsurance avoids this kind of cost. 
As an initial matter, treaty reinsurance simply is not generally available for a 
variety of certain types of risks.132  Things like nuclear hazards are common, industry-
wide exclusions to most treaty reinsurance.133  Should an insurer wish to acquire 
reinsurance coverage for other common exclusions like long-haul trucking or munitions 
manufacturing, reinsurance coverage is usually only available facultatively.134  An 
individual arrangement can be made, although the cost of reinsuring the risk is greater 
than what would otherwise be available by treaty.135   
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The common practice of combining treaty and facultative reinsurance to protect 
an insurer’s loss history with its treaty reinsurer provides further support to the contention 
that insurers are sensitive to the current and future price of reinsurance premiums.136  
Companies use facultative insurance to protect loss histories even though reinsurance 
coverage for the facultative risk already existed under treaty reinsurance agreements.   
It is the insurer’s strategic decision to enter the additional facultative agreement as a 
hedge against the unexpected losses on the risk which would trigger a renegotiation of the 
insurer’s entire treaty.   
As an example, the Reinsurance Association of America137 describes a situation 
where in order to accommodate a policyholder, an insurer may agree to provide 
commercial automobile insurance coverage – a higher risk activity.  Facultative 
reinsurance138 would be appropriate even if the treaty reinsurance139 the insurer already 
acquired did not exclude commercial automobile coverage to “protect its losses under 
applicable treaty agreements”.  As the RAA points out, the facultative “rider” need not 
even be purchased from the treaty reinsurers, allowing those potential commercial 
automobile losses to be handled under a completely separate relationship.  This suggests 
the overall cost of ongoing higher treaty premiums is sufficiently grave to encourage the 
additional cost of “double reinsuring” certain risks, even at the relatively higher specific 
cost of the facultative agreement. 
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In any event, this common choice to pair facultative with treaty reinsurance to 
protect loss histories140 supports the conclusion reinsurers actively monitor loss histories.  
Monitoring underwriting practices and ensuring accrued losses would likewise result in 
the insurer implementing practices that conform with the reinsurance market’s interests 
and prevent them from making underwriting changes which may negatively effect their 
reinsurance opportunities.  To an extent, this natural interplay of loss history with 
reinsurance costs can create a self-regulating and self-limiting tendency among certain 
insurers to produce loss histories lower than similarly situated insurers.   
The simplest way for insurers to decrease loss histories is to restrict their business 
to lower risk policyholders or limit their dollar exposure to those risks.  A “cherry 
picked” book of business, for example could attract more reinsurance interest; as a result, 
in the cherry-picking insurer can charge lower premiums to gain an even bigger bowl of 
cherries.  There would still be an interest in insuring and reinsuring lemons, of course, so 
long as they can and will pay higher premiums which could be shared with the reinsurer, 
but the potential for reinsurance pricing to encourage cherry-picking can be somewhat 
troubling.  The competitive advantage an insurer can obtain through reduced reinsurance 
premiums may militate against the traditional benefits afforded by the law of large 
numbers.  The insurer could determine their best option for profit lay in the reinsurance 
cost saving produced by the lower risks.   
An insurer with a sufficiently broad market share and multi-line business, of 
course, could get what would amount to a “bulk discount” for placing most of its 
reinsurance business with one company.  But, if smaller insurers took the “cherry” 
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approach and were rewarded with sufficiently lower premiums to compete against even 
the “bulk” advantage, the move towards segmentation would start when the big insurer 
slowly (or even quickly) began to loose enough of its cherries to affect its loss history in 
a way significant enough to offset its “bulk” appeal to its reinsurers.  Remember, the 
reinsurance market is extremely broad, with at least 50% of domestic insurers reinsured 
by foreign companies.141  There is likely always some reinsurer around with a taste for 
cherries. 
Importantly, reinsurance’s effect on cherry-picked risk premiums does not always 
result in the company actually restricting their business to those “better” risks alone.  
There is no reason why reinsurance treaties must be structured so as to take the entire 
book of business for a certain type of risk, though they often are structured that way.  An 
insurer could reinsure with one company for their “better” risks at the lower prices, seek a 
competitive advantage on the market, and move the worse risks into a different book 
charged higher premiums; premiums sufficient to entice a different reinsurer.142  A 
different insurer could acquire better overall pricing by averaging the two pools, but it 
could face difficulty getting those cherries away from the segmented insurer, moving the 
whole market towards segmentation.   
Additionally, an insurer could try to create the best of both worlds by combining 
and aggregating individual policyholders into the broadest possible policyholder pool; 
broad policyholder pools represent “better” opportunities for a variety of reasons.  If, for 
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example, the worse risks in one line were restricted to those who proved more profitable 
for the company on some other business basis, like companies interested in multi-line 
policies or companies which in some sense represent loss leaders, the higher reinsurance 
premiums could be offset for even those “worse” risks.  This offset provides the book of 
business with a competitive advantage.  Undoubtedly, these considerations account in 
part for the insurance industry’s constant research and refinement of ways to most 
accurately reflect the underwriting risks and potential ancillary benefits of all types of 
policyholders using all types of identifying criteria.  Best information is of obvious 
benefit to any insurer, but when leveraged by the potentially significant added value from 
reinsurance benefits, the value of the information is even greater and offers one company 
the potential to gain significant advantage over another.  Unfortunately, all of these 
factors could lead to the identification of a certain class of generally unattractive risks 
with fewer insuring options other than higher premiums in that restrictive underwriting 
has the capacity to self-support segmentation through beneficial reinsurance rates.   
It would be extremely interesting to identify empirically whether certain state 
actions, such as prohibiting coverage refusals to certain classes of policyholders in their 
state results in an initial spike in the cost of reinsurance for the reinsureds who must 
extend their underwriting in conformity with those new mandates.  Likewise, it would be 
very interesting to determine how long, if at all, such a spike continued to exist and 
whether a new underwriting requirement became sufficiently common that the effect 
disappeared.    
Additionally, the hypothetical situations described above discount the likelihood 
that there are various liquidity cycles for reinsurers themselves.  Issues completely 
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exogenous to the underwriting choices of America’s domestic insurers may affect the 
reinsurance market and competition among and between reinsurers; for various reasons, 
these issues implicate those reinsurers’ decisions about whom to reinsure and at what 
price.  This reinsurance market problem is addressed more completely in Section IV. 
B.  Reinsurance and Claims-Handling 
The duty of uberrima fides or utmost good faith143 applicable to reinsurance 
relationships has implications beyond the requirement of simply making “reasonable” 
underwriting decisions; it creates duties the reinsured owes the reinsurer which involve 
issues of claims handling.  The duty of utmost good faith on the part of the reinsurer is 
generally held to create reciprocal obligations on the part of the reinsured in the claims 
handling process.144  Failure to appropriately comport with these obligations can offer the 
reinsurer a contractual defense and release the reinsurer from its indemnity obligation.145 
These fall into three broad obligations: 1) the duty to disclose material facts about the 
ceded business during the placement process, 2) the duty to notify the reinsurer of 
potential claims that could impact reinsurance coverage and 3) the duty to handle the 
claim in a proper and “businesslike” manner.146   
Each of these duties can, in the right circumstances, create and maintain industry 
standards and practices.  Particularly the duty to disclose material information and 
conduct “business like” claims handling will require, even in the absence of any formal 
underwriting or claims handling regulations, a certain industry-determined level of 
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investigation when placing coverage and can encourage formalized claims handling 
processes so as to justify claims determinations.147  After all, an insurer is unlikely to 
grant a policyholder’s claim, particularly a large claim, in a manner which could provide 
the reinsurer with a defense to its indemnity obligations.  To a certain extent, this 
obligation creates a natural, or at least a contractually-created floor on the generosity of 
claims handlers when making decisions to cover.  Additionally, in the least, managers 
aware of claims handling obligations incline towards formalizing claims handling 
decisions to prohibit the reinsurer from invoking poor claims handing as a defense.148 
Even though, as described below, the claims handling would have to be so poor to 
constitute recklessness or gross negligence to have a chance of success in a coverage 
dispute, the fact that claims handling processes are monitored as part of all decisions to 
reinsure (just as with underwriting) would also encourage reinsurers to adopt formalized 
claims handling processes.   
How claims handling implicates reinsurance coverage obligations performing 
reinsurance contracts requires some explanation about the nature of the obligations and 
how courts marry reinsurer obligations to perform with the reciprocal obligations of 
utmost good faith.149  A key point to remember is that the duty of utmost good faith is 
mutual.150  In the reinsurance context, this is not some amorphous responsibility or the 
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more frequently encountered lesser duty not to behave egregiously that is the underlying 
justification of policyholder “bad faith” actions.  Rather, the reinsurance company’s duty 
of utmost good faith acts as a powerful judicially-supported standard of care when 
examining the reinsurer’s performance of its two primary obligations.151  Those 
obligations are the responsibility of the reinsurer to “follow the fortunes” and “follow the 
settlements” of their reinsureds.152    
Briefly, the “follow the fortunes” doctrine obligates a reinsurer to pay its share of 
a loss sustained by its reinsured, so long as the reinsured’s claims handling did not 
constitute reckless or grossly negligent behavior, and the loss is arguably covered by the 
original policy and the reinsurance agreement.153  This clause obligates a reinsurer to 
indemnify its reinsured for its good faith payment of claims that arguably fall within the 
scope of the agreement – no “second guessing” allowed.154  Likewise, the “follow the 
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settlements’ refers to the duty to follow the actions of the cedent in adjusting and settling claims.”). 
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settlements” obligation requires indemnification of the reinsured for good faith settlement 
decisions.155   
One “follow the settlements” case is particularly illuminating of the capacity of 
purportedly “poor” claims handling to release the reinsurer from its indemnity obligation.  
In Suter v. General Accident Ins. Co., the court focused on claims handling improprieties 
in its decision to release the reinsurer of its obligation arising from the reinsured’s 
settlement.156  The case involved tort claims asserted against a manufacturer of allegedly 
defective heart-valves by patients who had received the potentially defective valves.157  
The manufacturer was the original insured which settled claims with the consent of the 
original insurer which sought indemnity from its reinsured.158   
Interestingly, the “claims handling” improprieties identified in this decision were 
all actually related to the insurer’s legal acumen and choices made in evaluating and 
defending the claim.159  They primarily were issues involving the proper use of coverage 
counsel and appropriate pre-settlement litigation tactics.160  The court determined that 
failure to seek certain types of legal counsel and take certain investigatory steps could 
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constitute “gross negligence”.161  The court cited the insurer’s reliance on another 
insurer’s counsel for its appraisal of potential liability as inappropriate.162  Likewise, it 
cited failure of the insurer to hire its own medical expert (again it had relied on another 
insurer’s expert) to advise on the heart-valves potential for bodily injury and a failure of 
the insurer to keep up to date on the laws of trigger of coverage as determinative 
factors.163  Relying on these litigation process failures, the court determined that the 
insurer had failed to make a reasonable investigation of whether the underlying claims 
were “reasonably within the scope of the original policy”.164  As such, the reinsurer was 
freed from its presumptively applicable duty to follow the insurer’s settlement. 165 
To those familiar with the tort litigation process, this demonstrates a privately 
assumed obligation’s effect on the legal process and litigation costs.  By focusing on the 
insurer’s choice not to hire independent counsel or rely on other medical experts as 
grounds for release from reinsurance obligations, the court explicitly allows the 
reinsurance contract obligation of reasonable investigation to affect the insurer’s business 
judgment to save the cost of its own counsel or experts.166  In effect, this type of decision 
requires the use of coverage counsel by each insurer implicated on a claim and 
                                                 
 
161
 Id at 785. 
 
162
 Id at 785. 
 
163
 Id at 781. 
 
164
 Id at 781. 
 
165
 The interpretation of the utmost good faith standard condition precedent to reasonableness in claims 
handling as used in the Suter decisions is remarkable given that a finding of good faith has been held 
sufficient to require performance by a reinsurer to indemnify payments found to be reasonably within the 
terms of the original policy, even if not technically covered by it.  See General Ins. Corp. v. Great America 
Insurance Company, 979 F.2d 268, 280 (2d Cir. 1992).  
 
166
 Id at 785. 
 42 
institutionalizes the added cost of duplicative legal analysis and investigation of claims 
where reinsurance is implicated or risk being viewed as not acting in utmost good 
faith.167   
Even in cases where there would probably be little disagreement as to the likely 
value of the claims or medical evidence of causation, how could an insurer not be 
expected to cover its assets with duplicative legal opinions?  One way or another, the 
litigation costs will eventually be internalized by the obligated insurers and passed to 
policyholders in the form of higher premiums.  Moreover, as the decision in Suter stems 
from the universally applicable good faith obligation of the insurer to reasonably 
investigate as a predicate to the reinsurer’s performance under the reinsuring agreement, 
this duplicative effort would likely become simple industry practice.168  Even if there is 
no reinsurer obligated on the particular claim, reinsurers investigate and monitor claims 
handling philosophy.  An insurer thinking about their future interest in reinsurance will 
take steps to ensure their claims handling demonstrates their history of operating in a 
non- grossly negligent manner.   
One caveat: it is of course possible that this added duplicative cost could be so 
cost prohibitive the insurer would prefer to simply avoid reinsurers and internalize the 
litigation savings.  As described above, the benefits of reinsurance, particularly the ability 
to stabilize profits and leverage reserves makes such a choice unlikely.169  For various 
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reasons, an insurer remains aware of the chance it will in future need reinsurance.  If 
anything, knowingly producing largely duplicative legal work would simply lead insurers 
to pressure their attorneys to reduce the cost of redundant legal services, if it cannot 
reduce the need to complete the work in the first place.  Perhaps this accounts for some of 
the insurance industry’s interest in creating legal services compensation structures which 
offer opportunities for “bulk rate” services and long-term billing agreements. 
Follow-the-settlements170 decisions are not the only instance where reinsurance 
affects insurer litigation practices.  As the original policies reinsured often provide for a 
defense, the costs will likewise be covered under the reinsurance agreement, unless a 
specific exclusion exists.171   
Another example stems from using the declaratory judgment action to determine 
coverage disputes.172  Many reinsurance agreements include a clause which states that the 
agreement covers “all expenses incurred in the investigation and settlements of claims or 
suits”.173  As described above, such a clause makes sense in relation to the reinsurer’s 
interest in not indemnifying claims beyond the scope of the policy they are reinsuring.  It 
also makes sense for the reinsured to seek to lay-off these costs to the reinsurer where 
much of the benefit of the coverage determination would accrue to the reinsurer on the 
risk.174  Some interpret this clause to include costs incurred by the reinsured for bringing 
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declaratory judgment actions to avoid coverage of the original policyholder’s claim.175  
Moreover, in the absence of an exclusion, the “standard practice” of the industry to allow 
for such costs can create a sufficient question of fact to support an implied modification 
of the contract sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.176  Even in the 
absence of a clause, declaratory judgment costs have been upheld as part of the contract 
as a result of the parties “custom and practice”.177  In this circumstance, the ability of 
insurers to introduce extrinsic evidence to supplement an alleged ambiguity is 
particularly useful.  
 
III. Institutional Regulatory Effects of Reinsurance on Public Regulation of 
Insurance:  The Silent Force 
The underlying concepts of regulation in the domestic financial services industries 
share in common a considerable amount of policy determinations and overlap among 
industries to a considerable degree.178  The regulatory structures among industries, 
however, often vary considerably among the differing sectors 179 and in a not altogether 
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consistent fashion.180  This Essay does not have a goal to review the various types of 
regulatory differences among the numerous sectors of industry devoted to financial 
transactions,181 although such an observation assists in (not surprinsingly) recoginizing 
that a certain amount of variance exists within the regulatory tools in any given sector of 
the financial services industries.   
The subject of this Essay is the regulation of the particular and perhaps even 
peculiar area of financial services known as the insurance industry.182  Importantly, 
insurance company regulation is a topic fraught with considerations far beyond regulation 
of individual risk inherent to all financial regulatory regimes.  Considerations include 
                                                                                                                                                 
disclosure rules established by the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 as a 
regulatory method as compared with the capital and reserve requirements insurance companies must 
maintain to comply with statutory leverage requirements. 
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those which the contractual arrangement of reinsurance and the nature of the reinsurance 
market can influence.  
Particularly with insurance, the fiscal ramifications of wide scale insurance failure 
typify an externality often identified as justification for proper insurance regulation.  
Mass insurance defaults in the wake of catastrophe and its concomitant public cost counts 
among the reasons why reevaluation of insurance regulation gained such primacy in 
current years.183  Who wants to contemplate a Gulf Coast where companies severely 
reduced coverage due to insurer insolvency?  
The issue of risk containment obviously influences the structural regulation of the 
insurance industry; political interest championing equitable access to insurance and other 
redistributive and equitable norms alongside the unique state regulatory system of 
insurance all play their part in developing the regulatory structure in which the industry 
currently operates.  Reinsurance market practices and common contract terms can 
alternately promote or prohibit many of these interests.     
1. Reinsurance and Liquidity  
Reinsurance is a source of liquidity.  Due to the way the insurance industry 
calculates income, the administrative expenses are charged immediately upon issuing an 
insurance policy.184  For this reason, broker’s fees or taxes or other ancillary expenses 
will be charged immediately as income with a concomitant net loss of outstanding 
surplus.185  The premiums collected by the insurance company, on the other hand, must 
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be set aside in an unearned premium reserve and will only be recognized over the term of 
the policy.186  The purpose of this accounting system is to encourage insurer solvency.187  
However, the situation clearly results in the potential to decrease capacity.  With every 
policy sold, the surplus is decreased and the company’s ability to write more policies 
lessened.  
Reinsurance solves the surplus problem, since the reinsurer agrees to share a 
portion of the expenses.  A reinsurer gives the reinsured a “ceding credit” for a share of 
the expenses, which can be recredited to the reinsured’s surplus, increasing capacity.  
Likewise, the reinsurance agreement can be credited against loss reserves to similarly 
increase capacity.188  
In order for the increased capacity to not jeopardize insurer solvency189, 
reinsurance company regulation focuses on reinsurer solvency.  This is no idle matter.  
Both the Transit Casualty Company and Mission Insurance Company failed due to 
insurance insolvency in the 1980’s.190  The failure occurred in part because they could 
not collect from their reinsurers.  To address this risk, the states all have various 
techniques in place to assure reinsurer solvency.  If admitted or licensed in the state, the 
reinsurer must comport with certain reserve requirements of their own or, if foreign or 
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unadmitted, states require the reinsurer to offer a bond sufficient to allay fears of not 
collecting on reinsurance agreements.191  If the company does not post a bond, the insurer 
cannot take advantage of reinsurance’s ability to grant credit and expand reserves.192 
Still, the multi-state system leads to some fears of inadequacy and redundancy.  
To address these issues, along with the perennial problem of construing the appropriate 
way for the states to share in the taxation of these transactions, the House of 
Representatives in June 2007 passed HR 1065, the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform 
Act.193  The Senate companion bill, S 929, awaits consideration in the Senate.194  That 
legislation would grant a single state authority to determine the appropriateness of 
reinsurance credit and reinsurer solvency assessment.195  The solvency assessment would 
be conducted by the reinsurer’s home state and the credit determination would be made 
solely by the ceding insurer’s domiciliary state.196  It is unclear how this alters the current 
regulatory system other than to encourage reinsurers or insurers to change their domiciles 
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in search of a state whose regulation best comports with their needs, though it likely will 
assist in clarifying taxation.   
2. Consumer Protection 
Since reinsurance is considered a business to business transaction, it is subject to 
significantly less regulatory oversight beyond issues of solvency.  As described above, 
however, reinsurance’s ability to indirectly affect the policyholder though inculcating and 
rewarding reinsurer-focused underwriting decisions and claims handling processes exist 
and current regulatory schemes do not address them.     
There are some significant policy concerns implicated in other commonly 
available reinsurance coverage clauses such as those making reinsurance coverage 
available for bad faith judgments.  Called “judgment in excess of policy limits” clauses 
these allow insurers to be indemnified for their own bad faith actions against their policy 
holders.  As reported in Ostrager & Newman’s Handbook on Insurance Coverage 
Disputes, these clauses generally provide “in word or substance”197: 
It is agreed that should the ceding insurer become legally obligated to pay 
a loss in excess of policy limits by reason of alleged or actual negligence, 
fraud or bad faith in rejecting an offer of settlement or in the defense or 
trial of any action against an insured, the Reinsurer agrees to assume 
____% of said loss [in excess of the ceding insurer’s] $ _____ retention.198  
 
These clauses are “relatively widely used and provide[] the reinsurer will 
participate in such excess verdicts but not to exceed the reinsurance contract limits”.199  
Moreover, there are iterations of this clause which explicitly provide for coverage of 
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“punitive damages”.200  Other courts have found reinsurer’s liable for bad faith judgments 
even in the absence of such a clause, but where the reinsurance agreement does contain 
the early omnipresent “follow the fortunes” language.201  The “excess of policy limits 
clause” has been applied in bad faith decisions based on both contractual and tortious 
theories of liability.202 
Various state statutes, including those with  primarily a regulatory purpose and 
the common law, both authorize bad-faith actions against insurers as a way to deter bad 
faith activities. Thus, it is somewhat surprising to find them reinsurable as a matter of 
public policy.  Considering that the reinsurance agreements are supported by the 
premiums charged the policyholders, it seems somewhat incongruous to allow the cost of 
insurer’s own bad faith judgments to be charged directly back to policyholders in their 
premiums.  In fact, it seems to mitigate the entire purpose of the statute, the legal action 
and the tort judgment, beyond the insurer’s own retention.  Since that retention may or 
may not be greater than the public cost of supporting the civil justice system to allow for 
the trial of these cases, one wonders if there is any public benefit at all.  Clearly, this type 
of indemnification reduces the deterrent value of these actions.  There can be little 
deterrence through litigation and the award of damages, tortious or otherwise, if those 
judgments are indemnified by reinsurer’s as a matter of course.  Granted, reinsurers are 
sensitive to loss histories so too common a number of negligent or bad faith judgments 
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could increase their costs to reinsure.  Still, that market based result seems somewhat less 
than the affect contemplated by legislators who enact bad faith statutes.   
IV. Conclusion 
Reinsurance agreements certainly have the capacity to influence insurer behavior.  
The effect of these agreements and the manner in which courts enforce their performance 
likely leads to the institutionalization of systems beyond and not necessarily congruent 
with many of the expectations and avowed purposes of some regulatory activity.   
Insurance is often dubbed an industry affecting the public interest; if that is so, 
then reinsurance should acquire that denomination as well.  Though silent, operating 
through private contract alone, it has the capacity to regulate insuring behavior.  To be 
effective, this Essay suggests that regulatory discussions of the insurance industry be 
expanded to recognize the regulatory capacity of the reinsuring industry.  To fail to do so 
is to ignore a fundamental financial influence on the entire insurance industry with the 
likely result that the silent regulator will continue to operate below even the notice of our 
sometimes raucous public one. 
